In order to regulate the excessive profitseeking behavior of industrial and commercial capital in rural areas, a tripartite evolutionary game model of local government, industrial and commercial capital and farmers was constructed to analyze the stabilizing conditions and influencing factors of the evolution of different behavioral strategies, and to clarify the mechanism of regulating the excessive profitseeking behavior. The results show that: local governments have found that there were critical values for the amount of punishment, support funds and distribution ratio of industrial and commercial capital violations, additional income and adjustment coefficient of illegal operation of industrial and commercial capital under the active participation of farmers, and greater or less than a critical value would change the direction of industrial and commercial capital behavior; the probability of violations of industrial and commercial capital and the longterm and shortterm income of farmers during government supervision do not change the evolution direction of industrial and commercial capital behavior; conditions could be generated for the system to evolve into an ideal state. For this purpose, the regulation measures are put forward, such as maintaining a higher amount of punishment for violations of industrial and commercial capital, setting up reasonable support funds and distribution ratio.