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| On the Reward and Punishment Mechanism of Collusion of Live Commerce Platforms from the Perspective of Governmental Regulation |
| Li Guohao, Mei Ting, Liang Yongtao |
| School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, China |
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Abstract The new marketing model of “live show + ecommerce” is developing rapidly, but there are many problems along with the booming. This paper studies how the live commerce platforms and the platform merchants collude to garner excessive profits, builds an evolutionary game model between live commerce platforms and government regulatory agencies based on different reward and punishment mechanisms, analyzes the stability of equilibrium points in the system, and conducts a simulation analysis. The results show: under both the static reward and punishment mechanism and the dynamic reward and static punishment mechanism, there is no stable equilibrium point; under both the static reward and dynamic punishment mechanism and the dynamic reward and dynamic punishment mechanism, there is a stable equilibrium point, but under the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism, there is a lower probability of collusion between the platforms and the merchants. Under the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism, the collusion between the platforms and live esellers is closely related to the rewards and punishments: when the punishment increases, the probability of collusion between them decreases, and the cost of governmental supervision decreases as well; when the reward increases, the probability of strict governmental supervision decreases, and the probability of collusion between the platforms and the sellers decreases but little. Therefore, the scientific and reasonable dynamic reward and punishment mechanism adopted by the regulators is conducive to the stable development of the live streaming industry.
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