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An Analysis of Intercity Passenger Transportation
Price Control Based on Pricing Game |
School of Automobile and Traffic Engineering, Jiangsu University |
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Abstract The equilibrium theory and generalized expense model of public transportation are used to analyze the influence of investment return rate and price cap regulation on intercity passenger transportation structure so as to seek out the control strategy about intercity passenger transportation price and optimize the structure of passenger transport, in face of the two possible pricing games of free competition and collusion that may be adopted by the intercity passenger transportation duopoly market oligarchs in urban agglomeration. The combination of the two regulations can promote effective investment and optimize intercity passenger transportation structure.
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Received: 23 October 2011
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